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Abstract 
Long-term care insurance plays an important role in Japan, where dual problems of an aging population and 
low birthrate have continued. Such insurance affects the macro-economy through many mechanisms, with 
both negative and positive influences. Although increased taxes and insurance premiums from long-term care 
decrease consumption, decreasing precautionary saving eventually increases consumption because of 
decreased risks of long-term care and mitigation of self-payment for people receiving long-term care services. 
Furthermore, effects on household consumption by the aging population and low birthrate are expected to 
differ among regional economies. This study, particularly addressing insurance effects on household 
consumption and the regional economy, develops a theoretical model for household consumption and 
assesses numerical examples of macroeconomic effects using parameters that are consistent with data for 
Japan. Furthermore, using a multi-regional input–output (MRIO) table at the prefectural level in Japan, we 
examine long-term care insurance effects on household consumption and economic ripple effects occurring 
regionally and nationally. The results reveal differences in insurance effects by region and by household 
generation. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), representing total economic activity, rises. Gross Regional 
Product (GRP) can also be pulled up. However, because of a difference in the degrees of increase in GRP in 
the respective regions, GRP inequality can be magnified. Specifically considering these results, we assess 
relations between regional economic disparities and improvements in long-term care insurance. 
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I Introduction 
Our study examines how a subsidy for long-term care insurance affects aggregate consumption, gross 
domestic product, and other economic indicators. Japan’s long-term care insurance was launched in April 
2000: older people who require care can use the care service by paying 10% of the care service fee. The rate 
of 10% is applied to standard households. Actually, the rate benefit of 10–30% depends on the household 
income level. This insurance is specifically intended for the aging population and older people who use the 
long-term care services, whose numbers are increasing continuously.1 
Long-term care insurance reduces precautionary saving,2 which raises consumption. By virtue of long-
term care insurance, the future cost of long-term care can be small. People need not save for long-term care. 
Many will never need long-term care. This risk pooling effect of insurance is considered in work by Omori 
et al. (1998), Smith and Witter (2004), and others. 
Nevertheless, long-term care has a negative effect on consumption because the long-term care premium 
reduces household disposable income. A decrease in household income reduces consumption. Moreover, a 
decrease in household income and precautionary saving reduce the aggregate investment and the capital stock 
decreases. Subsequently, the aggregate production declines; GDP decreases. This negative effect is derived 
by Tabata (2005), Mizushima (2009), and others. 
This study was conducted to examine how a subsidy for long-term care affects the regional economy. 
Using a model with inter-regional trade and differences of industrial structure, this study examines how the 
subsidy affects consumption in regions. Specifically, after developing a household optimization model with 
long-term care and overlapping generations for the first stage, we empirically examine how the subsidy 
affects aggregate consumption using the multi-regional input–output (MRIO) table compiled by Hasegawa 
et al. (2015). Based on results obtained from this study, we conclude that the subsidy for long-term care plays 
an important role in an aging population by promoting the regional economy and by mitigating income 
inequality. 
Yasuoka (2016) demonstrates that the subsidy for long-term care affects aggregate consumption and 
utility, among other factors. Nevertheless, no report of the relevant literature describes a study examining 
income inequality between regions in terms of the subsidy for long-term care. 
The results obtained through this study are presented as follows. A decrease in the self-care fee (from 
20% to 10%) with an increase in the premium of long-term care insurance raises the aggregate consumption 
of young and adult generations. Even if the premium reduces consumption, a decrease in precautionary saving 
can raise consumption. However, the aggregate consumption by old people is decreased by an increase in the 
long-term care premium. Nevertheless, one must consider inequality within regions in terms of GDP as the 
total economic activity in the country increases. Because of a decrease in self-care fees that is expected to 
occur along with the increase in premium of long-term care insurance, the inequality of Gross Regional 
Product (GRP) within regions is magnified. Therefore, a redistributive policy to reduce inequality must be 
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considered. 
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section II explains the MRIO model to examine the 
subsidy for long-term care. Based on the overlapping-generations model, Section III develops a theoretical 
model with household optimization. Section IV presents derivation of the theoretical analysis results with 
numerical examples and input–output analysis. In the final section, we conclude this paper. 
 
II Input–output Model for Long-term Care Insurance Analysis 
1 Multi-regional Input–output Table at the Japanese Prefectural Level 
Our study was conducted using an MRIO table to identify the comprehensive effects on regions and 
industries of long-term care insurance.3 Regional input–output tables are classifiable into intra-regional, 
inter-regional, and MRIO tables. Whereas intra-regional input–output tables endogenously identify 
transactions within a single region and inter-regional transactions do so exogenously, inter-regional and 
MRIO tables endogenously consider both transactions and clarify the interrelations between regions. 
Therefore, using MRIO tables is desirable for the comprehensive identification of economic repercussions 
generated inside and outside a region. 
In Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) officially compiles an inter-regional 
input–output table for Japan, which is divided for the purpose into nine regions. However, some difficulties 
exist in application of this table to our analysis. A district in the table is simply a large single area with 
diversity in terms of population and economy. It does not coincide with the regional segment that a single 
local government manages. Therefore, policy implications cannot be derived from using the METI table. 
For analyses at the prefectural level, we use an MRIO table that includes all prefectures in Japan. 
Although the MRIO table is not officially compiled by the administrative office, some earlier studies, such 
as those by Ishikawa and Miyagi (2004), Hagiwara (2011), and Hasegawa et al. (2015), have included 
attempts to compile the tables. This study uses the table compiled by Hasegawa et al. (2015), which is freely 
available online at the Journal of Economic Structures website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table 1 Industrial Classification in the MRIO Table 
 
 
 
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries
(21) Medicaments (41) Office machines and
machinery for service
industries
(61) Gas, steam, and hot
water supply
(2) Metal ores (22) Petroleum refinery
products
(42) Household electric and
electronic appliances
(62) Water supply and other
sanitary services
(3) Nonmetal ores (23) Coal products (43) Electronic computing
equipment and
accessory equipment
(63) Trade
(4) Coal, crude petroleum,
and natural gas
(24) Plastic products (44) Communication
equipment
(64) Financial service and
insurance
(5) Food and tobacco (25) Rubber products (45) Applied electronic
equipment and electric
measuring instruments
(65) Real estate agencies,
managers, and rent
(6) Drinks (26) Glass and glass products (46) Semiconductor devices
and integrated circuits
(66) House rent (imputed
house rent)
(7) Fabric (27) Cement and cement
products
(47) Electronic components (67) Transport
(8) Apparel and other ready-
made textile products
(28) Pottery, china, and
earthenware
(48) Industrial heavy
electrical equipment
(68) Telecommunication
(9) Timber and wooden
products
(29) Miscellaneous ceramic,
stone, and clay products
(49) Other electrical
equipment
(69) Broadcasting
(10) Wooden furniture and
accessories
(30) Pig iron and crude steel (50) Motor vehicles (70) Information service
(11) Pulp and paper (31) Steel (51) Other motor vehicles (71) Internet services
(12) Converted paper
products
(32) Cast and forged
materials
(52) Steel ships and repair (72) Video and data entry
services
(13) Publishing and printing (33) Other iron or steel
products
(53) Other transportation
equipment and repair
(73) Advertising services
(14) Chemical fertilizer (34) Nonferrous metals (54) Precision machinery (74) Public administration
(15) Industrial inorganic
chemicals
(35) Nonferrous metal
products
(55) Miscellaneous
manufacturing products
(75) Education and research
institute
(16) Petroleum chemical
basic products
(36) Metal products for
construction and
architecture
(56) Reuse and recycling (76) Medical service, health,
social security, and
nursing care
(17) Organic chemical
products
(37) Other metal products (57) Construction and repair
of construction
(77) Goods renting/leasing
(18) Resin (38) General industrial
machinery
(58) Public construction (78) Other business services
(19) Chemical fiber (39) Special industrial
machinery
(59) Other civil engineering
and construction
(79) Personal service
(20) Final chemical products (40) Other general machines
and parts
(60) Electric power (80) Other
5 
 
 
Fig. 1 MRIO Table structure. 
 
Data used in the MRIO table are those for 2005. The MRIO table includes data of 47 prefectures in 
Japan and 80 industrial sectors. The industrial classification is shown in Table 1. Figure 1 depicts the structure 
of the table used for our study. As presented in Fig. 1, transactions in the intermediate and final demand 
sectors are identifiable at the prefectural level. Imports and exports between prefectures are dealt with 
endogenously. The MRIO table includes imports (m) as a lump sum along the column direction 
independently from the intermediate input (A) and the final demand (f). 
The balance equations of the MRIO model are presented as Eq. (1). Also, X, A, f, and e are the respective 
vectors of production, matrix of input coefficient, vector of final demand, and vector of exports. Eq. (1) 
represents the balance equation of production values to the row direction: Eq. (1) can be rewritten as Eq. (2). 
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In that equation, (IʷA)ʷ1 represents the Leontief inverse matrix. Using it, the production value induced by 
final demand and exports can be determined. As presented in Fig. 1, the MRIO table excludes imports (m) 
in the intermediate and final demand sectors by deducting them from the column direction as a lump sum. 
Therefore, the import vector is originally excluded from Eqs. (1) and (2). 
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2 Construction of the Inter-regional Transaction Matrix of Private Consumption for Each 
Age Level 
Effects of long-term care insurance on consumption are expected to differ by age. Therefore, one must 
examine the effects of the respective age levels and divide private consumption by the respective age levels.4 
The process details are presented in Table 2. 
We explain the process of (1) in Table 2. Based on Kakei Chousa Nenpou (Statistics Japan, 2006a) in 
2005, we reallocate the consumption expenditure of each item (JPY per household, monthly) into 80 sectors 
in the MRIO table. Using information in the input–output table at the national level, we exchange the 
consumption expenditure shown by the consumer price with that shown by the producer price. One can obtain 
the annual national consumption expenditure per household of each age level by multiplying this 12 times.5 
 
Table 2 Process used to Divide Consumption Expenditure by Age Level 
 
Process Contents 
(1) Derivation of annual consumption 
expenditure per household of each 
age level at the national level 
Considering the differences between Kakei Chousa Nenpou (Statistics Japan, 
2006a) and the input–output tables related to the concept, definition, and 
range in classifications, we reallocate the consumption expenditure of each 
item into sectors in the MRIO table. 
(2) Derivation of annual consumption 
expenditure at the prefectural and 
age levels 
This is obtainable by calculating (national consumption expenditure per 
household of each age level) × (number of households of each age level in 
each prefecture). The age level of the household is based on the head of 
household (seven classifications: less than 29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–64, 
65–69, and more than 70 years old). 
(3) Allocation of annual consumption 
expenditure of each age level in 
each prefecture 
Using inter-regional coefficients based on private consumption vectors in the 
MRIO table, we allocate the consumption expenditure into self-support and 
domestic imports from other regions. 
(4) Adjustment of private 
consumption in the MRIO table 
 
We use the RAS method to make the divided consumption by age levels 
consistent with the values in the MRIO table. For the RAS calculation, we 
use the divided consumption by age level as an initial matrix and total 
consumption for regions and industries as control totals. 
 
III The Model 
1 Model Setting 
In this section, based on Hasegawa and Yasuoka (2019), we develop a model for long-term care 
insurance. This economy has agents of two types: households and the government.6 
 
(1) Households 
Individuals live in three periods: the first period (youth, 15–39 years of age), the second period 
(adulthood, 40–64 years of age), and the third period (old age, 65–89 years of age). In the adult and old 
periods, individuals must pay a premium for long-term care insurance.7 
The budget constraint in the young period is shown as 
𝑐ଵ = (1 − 𝜀)𝑤ଵ − 𝑠ଵ . (3) 
In that equation, the following variables are used: 𝑤ଵ represents the wage rate in youth; 𝑠ଵ denotes saving 
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during youth; 𝜀 stands for the contribution rate for pension; and 𝑐ଵ signifies consumption during youth. 
Labor supply is provided elastically. 
The budget constraint in adulthood is 
𝑐ଶ = (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ଶ + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଵ − 𝑠ଶ, (4) 
Therein, 𝑤ଶ stands for wage rate in adulthood, 𝑟 denotes interest rate for 𝑠ଵ and 𝑠ଶ saving in adulthood, 
𝜏 represents the premium rate for long-term insurance, and 𝑐ଶ signifies consumption during adulthood. 
In old age, households face two health conditions: good and bad. 
They do not need long-term care if they are in good health. Then, the budget constraint is  
𝑐ଷ
௚ = 𝑧 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଶ − 𝑇. (5) 
In that equation, 𝑧 represents the pension benefit, 𝑇 denotes the premium for long-term care insurance, 
and 𝑐ଷ
௚ signifies consumption during old age with good health. 
The budget constraint in old age with bad health is 
𝑐ଷ௕ = 𝑧 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଶ − 𝑇 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜎. (6) 
That equation uses 𝜃 as the subsidy rate for long-term care, 𝜎 to represent long-term care cost, and 𝑐ଷ௕ to 
denote consumption in old age with bad health. Our study assumes that individuals cannot know the status 
of their health condition ex ante. In old age, the health condition is given. Therefore, uncertainty exists with 
respect to long-term care. 
We assume the following expected log utility function as 
𝑢௧ = 𝑙𝑛𝑐ଵ + 𝑙𝑛𝑐ଶ + 𝑝𝑙𝑛𝑐ଷ
௚ + (1 − 𝑝)𝑙𝑛𝑐ଷ௕. (7) 
In that equation, 𝑝 denotes the probability of long-term care; 1 − 𝑝 represents the probability of no long-
term care (0 < 𝑝 < 1). Individuals allocate 𝑠ଵ and 𝑠ଶ to maximize their utility Eq. (7) is subject to budget 
constraint Eqs. (3)–(6). Also, 𝑠ଵ and 𝑠ଶ are such that the following equations hold. 
1
(1 − 𝜀)𝑤ଵ − 𝑠ଵ
=
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ଶ + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଵ − 𝑠ଶ
 (8) 
1
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ଶ + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଵ − 𝑠ଶ
=
𝑝(1 + 𝑟)
𝑧 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଶ − 𝑇
+
(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟)
𝑧 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଶ − 𝑇 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜎
 (9) 
With 𝑠ଵ and 𝑠ଶ, we obtain 𝑐ଵ, 𝑐ଶ, 𝑐ଷ
௚ , and 𝑐ଷ௕ from Eqs. (3)–(6). 
 
(2) Government 
The government collects premiums from adults and old people and provides subsidies for long-term 
care. Considering 𝑛 as the population ratio between the adult and old generations, the budget constraint of 
long-term care insurance with balanced budget is given as 
(1 − 𝑝)𝜃𝜎 = 𝑛𝜏𝑤ଶ + 𝑇. (10) 
In addition, the government provides pension benefits financed by the revenue of premium and the fund. 
The balanced budget restriction does not hold. Being different from Hasegawa and Yasuoka (2019), the long-
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term care insurance is assumed for these analyses to be managed by the local government, which is consistent 
with the real economy. Therefore, the insurance premium 𝑇 differs among prefectures because of different 
long-term care costs (1 − 𝑝)𝜃𝜎. 
 
2 Long-term Care Insurance and Saving 
Based on Eq. (8), we examine how an increase in 𝜏 affects saving. The right-hand side of Eq. (8) can be 
raised by an increase in 𝜏. This expression shows an increase in marginal utility of 𝑐ଶ; then the individuals 
raise 𝑠ଵ. In other words, an increase in the premium fee of the young adult generation raises saving during 
the young period. 
Considering Eqs. (9) and (10), we obtain the following equation. 
1
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ଶ + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଵ − 𝑠ଶ
=
𝑝(1 + 𝑟)
𝑧 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଶ − 𝑇
+
(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟)
𝑧 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠ଶ − 𝑇 − 𝜎 +
𝑛𝜏𝑤ଶ + 𝑇
(1 − 𝑝)
 (11) 
The left-hand side of Eq. (11) represents the marginal utility of 𝑐ଶ. The right-hand side shows the marginal 
utility of 𝑐ଷ
௚ and 𝑐ଷ௕. An increase of 𝜏 raises the marginal utility of 𝑐ଶ; individuals reduce 𝑠ଶ. 
With an increase in 𝑇, 𝑠ଶ increases if the marginal effect of 𝑐ଷ
௚ (shown as the first term in the right-
hand side of Eq. (11)) is greater than that of 𝑐ଷ௕ (shown as the second term in the right-hand side of Eq. 
(11) ). Otherwise, 𝑠ଶ reduces. 
In the following subsection, we check the result obtained using the theoretical analysis using numerical 
examples. 
 
3 Numerical Examples 
Based on work reported by Yasuoka (2016, 2017) and by Hasegawa and Yasuoka (2019), we set the 
parameters for the numerical examples.8 As shown by the Cabinet Office, Japan (2018), the ratio of people 
requiring elderly care among the older population was 17.9% at the end of 2015. However, our analysis 
considers the case in which the local government manages long-term care insurance and considers the share 
of elderly care people to the older population in each prefecture. From data of the Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare, Japan (2017a), we can then obtain the share of elderly care people among the older population 
in the respective prefectures. The average is given as 17.9%. 
Recently, the long-term interest rate (10 years) in Japan is about 1% per year (Cabinet Office, Japan, 
2017). Youth and adulthood periods are 25 years, respectively. Therefore, we set 1 + 𝑟=1.282432. 
We set 𝑤ଵ=233.565625 and 𝑤ଶ=307.4125, as estimated based on the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (2016) and Statistics Japan (2018). The age level of wage for non-regular employment was 37.5% 
in 2015 in the estimation. 
The average long-term care cost is about 191,300 JPY per month, as shown by data for April 2015 
(Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2017b). Then, considering the annual amount, we set 𝜎 = 278.76 
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as the average. 
The pension contribution rate is 18.3%. Half of this 18.3% must be paid by the employee. Then, we set 
𝜀 =0.0915. 
Based on data reported by the Japan Pension Service (2016), the pension benefit is about 102,798 JPY 
per month. By considering the annual amount, we set 𝑧 =123.3576. 
The premiums of long-term care insurance for older people and adults are set as 
𝑇 =
0.22
0.5
𝜃𝜎(1 − 𝑝), (11) 
𝜏 =
0.28
0.5
𝜃𝜎(1 − 𝑝)
𝑁௬
𝑁௢
1
𝑤ଶ
, (12) 
where 𝑛 = ே೤
ே೚
 and 𝑁௬ and 𝑁௢ respectively denote the population sizes of the adult generation and the old 
generation. 
According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2017a), older people and adult populations 
were, respectively, 33.82 million and 42.2 million. In the fiscal system for long-term care insurance, the 
respective shares of tax and premium revenue of each were about half of the total fiscal scale. Regarding 
premium revenue, 22% is paid by older people and 28% by adults. The tax revenue is proportionally allocated 
for adults and older people based on the share of the premium revenue. 
Table 3 presents the parameter setting. 
 
Table 3 Parameter Setting 
 
1 + 𝑟 = 1.22019 
𝑤ଵ = 233.565625 
𝑤ଶ = 307.4125 
𝑝 = 0.821 (Average in Japan) (Max 𝑝 = 0.857, Min. 𝑝 = 0.778) 
𝜎 = 278.76 (Average in Japan) (Max 𝜎 = 307.56, Min. 𝜎 = 265.8) 
𝜀 = 0.0915 
𝑧 = 123.3576 
 
 
IV Analysis Results 
1 Results of a numerical example in a theoretical model 
First, we examine the results of a numerical example in a theoretical model of household behavior as set in 
section III. 
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As the case of the change of benefit rate of long-term care insurance, we analyze numerical examples 
of the case of an increase in θ from 0.8 to 0.9 and the case of a decrease in θ from 0.8 to 0.7. The benefit 
range in long-term care insurance in Japan is 10%–30%. Subsequently, we examine change in the effects of 
the benefit rate of 10%–30%. Table 4 presents the results. 
An increase in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance by which θ increases from 0.8 to 0.9 raises 
𝑐ଷ௕ by 10.12%. We can consider that households can cut the payment for long-term care cost and that the 
household can afford to increase consumption. However, 𝑐ଷ
௚ decreases by 2.24%. The reason is explainable 
as follows. An increase in the tax burden and insurance premium reduces household disposable income; 
thereby, consumption decreases. Furthermore, an increase in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance 
reduces household precautionary saving, which reduces consumption in the old period. 
Each of 𝑐ଵ  and 𝑐ଶ  increases slightly by 0.19%. An increase in the benefit rate of long-term care 
insurance reduces precautionary saving. Young and adult people can raise consumption because of a decrease 
in the necessity for saving. 
Results of the case of a decrease in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance show the inverse results 
of the case of an increase in the benefit rate. An increase (a decrease) in the benefit rate raises (reduces) the 
utility. This result corresponds to the result by which an increase (a decrease) in the benefit rate raises 
(reduces) the aggregate consumption, including every generation’s consumption. 
 
Table 4 Change rate of benefit rate, utility and consumption in the country 
 
2 Ripple effect of an increase in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance 
Based on Table 4, we check the ripple effect of an increase in benefit rate of long-term care insurance. 
Concretely, we examine the case of an increase in the benefit rate from 80% to 90%: we use the rate of 
change of each generation’s consumption by which the benefit rate changes from 80% to 90% (the rates of 
change of 𝑐ଵ, 𝑐ଶ, 𝑐ଷ
௚  and 𝑐ଷ௕  are shown respectively as 0.19%, 0.19%, -2.24%, 10.12%) to derive the 
induced production value and induced gross added value with the inter-prefectural input–output table. 
As a detailed explanation, we assume that the aggregate consumption of each generation in each 
prefecture is changed by the change of each generation’s consumption. We obtain the induced production 
value by which the change among of aggregate value is multiplied by the vector of private consumption of 
(%)
Young Adult (No Elderly Care) (Elderly Care)
(θ) (u) (c1) (c2) (cg3) (cb3)
0.7 -0.03010 -0.36067 -0.36071 2.56190 -9.70755
0.8 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 0.01595 0.19017 0.19007 -2.23589 10.11788
Benefit Rate Utility
Consumption
Old
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each age level. Moreover, we obtain the induced aggregate added value with the calculated induced 
production value multiplied by the coefficient of each prefecture and each industry derived using the inter-
prefectural input–output table. 
Therefore, our input–output analysis considers not an increase in the demand for elderly care by an 
increase in benefit rate of long-term care insurance but the effects of consumption expenditures of other kinds. 
Then we assume that the rate of change of each generation’s consumption is the same among prefectures, 
along with the inter-regional trade ratio and the ratio of each kind of consumption. Although these 
assumptions should be considered, our manuscript can hold the effect completely, not only on the elderly 
care service sector, but also on other kinds of industry. 
Our paper presents consideration of a three-period overlapping generations model with its respective 
young, medium, and old periods. In considering input–output analysis, we consider households headed by 
people who are ≤29 or 30–39 years old as those of the young period, households headed by people who are 
40–49, 50–59, or 60–64 years old as those of the adult period, and households headed by people who are 65–
69 or ≥70 years old as those of the old period. 
 
Table 5 Change of induced production value and induced aggregate added value 
 
Table 6 Change of GDP and aggregate consumption in household sector in the country 
 
(million yen)
1 2 3 4 47
Hokkaido Aomori Iwate Miyagi Okinawa
(A) 16432 72 73 172 78 24418
(B) 10357 35 35 88 39 14279
(A) 65 2986 15 37 18 4736
(B) 33 1963 8 19 9 2829
(A) 73 17 3141 39 20 5109
(B) 35 8 2123 20 9 3065
(A) 166 38 38 6299 38 10358
(B) 80 18 18 4082 18 6023
2 Aomori …
…
Production-
based total
1 Hokkaido …
3 Iwate …
4 Miyagi …
(A) 30 7 7 20 4206 5028
(B) 15 4 3 10 2560 2974
(A) 25584 5085 5266 10883 6479 587831
(B) 14615 2940 3103 6298 3602 337770
Note) (A) and (B) denote production value and gross value added, respectively, induced by increasing subsidy rate for elderly care.
Consumption-
based total
…
… … … … … … … …
47 Okinawa …
Values induced in each region
Values each region generates
(million yen)
Total
Elderly Care
Households
No Elderly Care
Households
Total
Households
GDP 106410 241669 988314 -998623 -10310 337770
Private Consumption 123109 279644 1147016 -1158981 -11965 390788
Old Households (More than 65 years old)Young Households (Less
than 39 years old)
Adult Households (40-
64 years old)
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By virtue of the induced production value calculated using an inter-prefectural input–output table in our 
analyses, we can check the trade relation not only for each industry but also for each prefecture. Table 5 
shows the calculated induced production value and the induced gross added value shown as the one sector of 
unit of a prefecture by summing up each industry sector. However, because showing all prefectures is 
complicated, we present part of the result. Regarding an increase in the long-term care insurance benefit rate, 
the induced value of each region brought about by the consumption in a region is shown by the column 
direction. The induced value of a region brought about by the consumption in each region is shown by the 
line direction in Table 5. Table 5 presents these effects on the consumption as the form of a matrix. Therefore, 
the sum of the column and line shows the total induced value brought about by a region (total value based on 
consumption) and the total induced value in a region (total value based on production). 
Next, we examine the results in terms of the induced value that is based on production, as shown by the 
sum of line in Table 5. The sum of induced production values shows the induced value in each prefecture 
brought about by a uniform increase in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance in a country. The gross 
induced added value shows the change of Gross Regional Product (GRP). We consider the total of change of 
GRP as the change of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Table 6 presents the change of household consumption and GDP in a country brought about by an 
increase in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance. Regarding GDP, thanks to an increase in the 
consumption of young households and medium households, GDP is pulled up by 106.4 billion JPY and 241.7 
billion JPY. Regarding effects of older households, elderly people who obtain long-term care benefits raise 
the consumption. However, elderly people who do not obtain long-term care insurance reduce the 
consumption. These two total effects reduce the consumption. Then GDP is reduced by 10.3 billion JPY. As 
a total effect, GDP and household consumption increase respectively by 33.78 billion JPY and 39.08 billion 
JPY. An increase in GDP is less than an increase in household consumption because the household 
consumption includes import goods. The increase in GDP attributable to domestic production ripple effects 
brought about by the domestic product is less than the resultant increase in household consumption. 
Table 7 presents the induced added value based on product value in Table 5 as a rate of increase of the 
Gross Regional Product (GRP). An increase rate by each household (young household, adult household and 
old household) is shown in addition to an increase rate by effects of every household. Here, GRP is derived 
as total of gross added value of each prefecture in the inter-prefectural input output table. 
Considering the effects of all households, there exists a 1.5615 times difference between prefectures 
from Yamanashi Pref., which shows the lowest increase rate of 0.0520%, to Okinawa Pref., which shows the 
highest increase rate of 0.0916%. However, considering the rate of increase of each generation’s households, 
a 1.9726 times difference and a 1.9103 times difference is found for young households and old households. 
Then it is apparent that the effects of an increase in Gross Regional Product brought about by these 
households differ among prefectures.  
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Table 7 Rate of GRP change brought about by changed household consumption 
 
(100 million yen) (%)
Elderly Care
Households
No Elderly Care
Households
total
1 Hokkaido 190626 0.0235 0.0537 0.2254 -0.2276 -0.0023 0.0749
2 Aomori 43927 0.0170 0.0497 0.2168 -0.2191 -0.0022 0.0644
3 Iwate 46482 0.0179 0.0504 0.2280 -0.2304 -0.0023 0.0659
4 Miyagi 84776 0.0226 0.0505 0.1993 -0.2013 -0.0020 0.0710
5 Akita 35280 0.0156 0.0501 0.2606 -0.2633 -0.0027 0.0631
6 Yamagata 39433 0.0162 0.0478 0.2369 -0.2394 -0.0025 0.0616
7 Fukushima 80572 0.0179 0.0476 0.2039 -0.2060 -0.0021 0.0634
8 Ibaraki 119807 0.0159 0.0420 0.1567 -0.1583 -0.0016 0.0563
9 Tochigi 81531 0.0151 0.0395 0.1497 -0.1513 -0.0016 0.0530
10 Gunma 74860 0.0187 0.0468 0.1884 -0.1904 -0.0020 0.0634
11 Saitama 203713 0.0195 0.0461 0.1660 -0.1678 -0.0017 0.0638
12 Chiba 195319 0.0201 0.0458 0.1701 -0.1718 -0.0018 0.0641
13 Tokyo 778489 0.0265 0.0492 0.1960 -0.1980 -0.0020 0.0737
14 Kanagawa 309801 0.0235 0.0479 0.1759 -0.1777 -0.0018 0.0697
15 Niigata 92849 0.0183 0.0510 0.2308 -0.2333 -0.0025 0.0667
16 Toyama 48318 0.0149 0.0415 0.1904 -0.1924 -0.0020 0.0543
17 Ishikawa 44808 0.0206 0.0483 0.1853 -0.1871 -0.0019 0.0671
18 Fukui 33516 0.0169 0.0461 0.2036 -0.2057 -0.0022 0.0608
19 Yamanashi 33517 0.0155 0.0383 0.1629 -0.1646 -0.0017 0.0520
20 Nagano 87329 0.0185 0.0449 0.2124 -0.2146 -0.0022 0.0613
21 Gifu 74017 0.0161 0.0428 0.1837 -0.1856 -0.0019 0.0569
22 Shizuoka 160258 0.0182 0.0447 0.1849 -0.1868 -0.0019 0.0609
23 Aichi 361629 0.0188 0.0401 0.1462 -0.1477 -0.0016 0.0574
24 Mie 78616 0.0174 0.0430 0.1863 -0.1882 -0.0019 0.0585
25 Shiga 60338 0.0181 0.0419 0.1629 -0.1646 -0.0017 0.0583
26 Kyoto 93248 0.0228 0.0502 0.2162 -0.2184 -0.0022 0.0708
27 Osaka 389299 0.0231 0.0504 0.2036 -0.2057 -0.0021 0.0714
28 Hyogo 185442 0.0210 0.0505 0.2035 -0.2057 -0.0021 0.0694
29 Nara 37342 0.0184 0.0506 0.2005 -0.2026 -0.0021 0.0670
30 Wakayama 35249 0.0175 0.0522 0.2514 -0.2540 -0.0026 0.0671
31 Tottori 20373 0.0213 0.0593 0.2571 -0.2599 -0.0028 0.0778
32 Shimane 25382 0.0166 0.0474 0.2440 -0.2465 -0.0025 0.0615
33 Okayama 78276 0.0203 0.0486 0.2181 -0.2203 -0.0023 0.0667
34 Hiroshima 122949 0.0210 0.0473 0.1996 -0.2017 -0.0021 0.0661
35 Yamaguchi 59920 0.0158 0.0420 0.2104 -0.2126 -0.0022 0.0555
36 Tokushima 28384 0.0187 0.0494 0.2242 -0.2265 -0.0023 0.0658
37 Kagawa 37149 0.0188 0.0481 0.2168 -0.2191 -0.0023 0.0647
38 Ehime 49885 0.0199 0.0513 0.2301 -0.2325 -0.0024 0.0688
39 Kochi 21939 0.0200 0.0544 0.2663 -0.2692 -0.0029 0.0716
40 Fukuoka 188141 0.0254 0.0555 0.2188 -0.2211 -0.0023 0.0786
41 Saga 27921 0.0184 0.0530 0.2342 -0.2367 -0.0025 0.0689
42 Nagasaki 42518 0.0195 0.0555 0.2559 -0.2586 -0.0027 0.0723
43 Kumamoto 56038 0.0205 0.0552 0.2532 -0.2559 -0.0027 0.0731
44 Oita 48151 0.0174 0.0440 0.1975 -0.1996 -0.0021 0.0593
45 Miyazaki 36291 0.0207 0.0525 0.2290 -0.2315 -0.0025 0.0708
46 Kagoshima 55418 0.0224 0.0570 0.2807 -0.2837 -0.0030 0.0763
47 Okinawa 32460 0.0294 0.0646 0.2098 -0.2122 -0.0024 0.0916
48 Total 5031582 0.0211 0.0480 0.1964 -0.1985 -0.0020 0.0671
1.9726 1.6877 1.9206 1.9205 1.9103 1.7615
Note: The shaded values denote maximum or minimum in each household’s classification.
Total
Households
Max/Min
Old Households
Adult
Households
Young
Households
GRP
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The highest increase rate in the effect on young households is in Okinawa Pref. (0.0294%), followed in 
order by Tokyo (0.0265%), Fukuoka (0.0254%), Kanagawa (0.0235%), Hokkaido (0.0235%), Osaka 
(0.0231%), and Kyoto (0.0228%). Based on the results, in an urban area with many young households and a 
low ratio of elderly people, an increase in GRP by an increase in the benefit rate of long-term care insurance 
is brought about by the strong effect of an increase in young household consumption. 
However, the highest decrease rates found for households that include both elderly care households and 
elderly care households is Kagoshima Pref. (0.0030%), followed in order by Kochi (0.0029%), Tottori 
(0.0028%), Nagasaki (0.0027%), Akita (0.0027%), Kumamoto (0.0027%), and Wakayama (0.0026%). 
Based on the results, in rural areas where the elderly person ratio is high, an increase in GRP is brought about 
by the strong effect of an increase in elderly household consumption. 
 
 
Figure 2 Lorenz curve of induced added value brought about by each household within prefectures. 
 
Table 8 Gini coefficient of induced gross added value and GRP brought about by each household 
 
 
We examine the induced gross added value of each prefecture with a Lorenz curve and the Gini 
coefficient. Figure 2 shows the Lorenz curve within prefectures. In calculating the Lorenz curve, we divide 
the induced gross added value based on production into households of three types. The horizontal line scale 
shows prefectures arranged in ascending order. The vertical line shows the cumulative ratio of the induced 
value of each prefecture. The rising right line in the figure represents the 45 degree line. The difference of 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Young Households
Adult Households
Old Households
Prefectures (in ascending order)
Gross value added (cum
ulative rate)
The 45°line
Elderly Care
Households
No Elderly Care
Households
Total
0.49454 0.50922 0.54547 0.49148 0.46590 0.46587 0.46388
GRP
Total
Households
Young
Households
Adult
Households
Old Households
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induced value within a prefecture is small if the Lorenz curve is close to the 45 degree line. Otherwise, the 
difference is large. 
Table 8 shows the Gini coefficient derived by the same calculation for induced gross added value and 
GRP brought about by the consumption of every household, in addition to the Gini coefficient that is derived 
by the Lorenz curve in Figure 2. The Gini coefficient is between 0 and 1. The large Gini coefficient 
underscores the inequality within regions. As shown by Table 8, the Gini coefficient of GRP is 0.495. 
However, the Gini coefficient of total households is 0.509. This result demonstrates that an increase in the 
benefit rate of long-term care insurance raises the GRP in the respective prefectures. However, an increase 
in GRP differs within prefectures. The inequality of consumption of total households is greater than the 
inequality of GRP within prefectures. 
Moreover, review of the Gini coefficients of each type of household reveals that young households have 
a coefficient of 0.545: the largest. Older households have a coefficient of 0.464: the smallest. This result 
indicates that the effect of a young household, that is, an increased effect on GRP, is biased to a great degree 
at the specific area, compared with the present inequality within prefectures. However, the decrease effect 
on GRP brought about by the consumption of older households is equally distributed within prefectures. 
Based on the results presented in Table 7, we can expect that the former effect is concentrated to specific 
urban areas in which many young households exist. However, the latter effect is equally distributed to rural 
areas in which the ratio of elderly residents is high. 
 
V Concluding Remarks 
This study examines how a subsidy for long-term care affects a regional economy theoretically and 
empirically. For theoretical analysis, we develop a three-period overlapping-generations model to examine 
how a subsidy for long-term care affects the consumption and saving of households. We derive results using 
numerical examples. Precautionary saving reduces the aggregate consumption, which consequently reduces 
GDP. A decrease in self-care costs achieved through long-term care insurance reduces precautionary saving. 
Therefore, aggregate consumption increases. Subsequently, GDP is raised. 
We note the following results obtained from these analyses. First, a decrease in self-care costs in long 
term care insurance raises the premium of long-term care insurance. An increase in the premium can reduce 
consumption because of a decrease in disposable household income. However, because of a decrease in 
precautionary saving, consumption by young and adult generations is raised. Consumption by elderly people 
can be reduced by an increase in the long-term care insurance premium even if the benefit of long-term care 
increases. This increase can raise consumption: some difference arises in terms of the effect on consumption 
among generations. 
It is especially noteworthy that a decrease in self-care cost of long-term care raises GDP and GRP. Even 
if the GRP can be raised in every prefecture, the degree of increase in GRP differs among prefectures. For 
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that reason, interregional inequality of GRP is magnified. Our paper presents derivation of the tradeoff 
between an increase in GDP as a total economic activity and the equality of GRP as an index of equality of 
interregional economic activity. 
Moreover, we can consider another aspect of long-term care insurance. A decrease in the self-care cost 
of long-term care insurance can raise demand for long-term care services provided by the market. Then, the 
informal elderly care provided by the family can decrease, as reported by Yasuoka (2018). This result brings 
about an increase in labor population. However, these analyses do not consider this aspect. That task is left 
for examination in future research. 
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1 People using elderly care in Japan reached approximately 6.44 million in 2018, increasing from 2.18 million 
people in 2000 (Data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan). 
2 Among the research efforts exploring saving behavior under uncertainty, Leland (1968), Caballero (1991), 
Liljas (1998), Picone et al. (1998), and Hemmi et al. (2007) theoretically explain the existence of precautionary 
saving. 
3 Ito and Takahashi (2000) examine the effects of long-term care insurance using regional input–output 
analysis. Hamamoto and Nakatani (2007) examine the effects of aging population on household consumption 
and government expenditure using input–output analysis. 
4 Based on explanations by Hamamoto and Nakatani (2007), we set re-allocation of the consumption 
expenditure in Kakei Chousa Nenpou (Statistics Japan, 2006a) as the consumption expenditure of each age level 
and each industrial sector. 
5 See Statistics Japan (2006a, 2006b, 2010). 
6 This study does not consider the firm optimization problem. The interest rate and wage rate are given 
exogenously. This assumption is not unusual. Generally, this assumption reflects a small open economy. 
7 By Japan’s long-term care insurance, people aged 40–64 years can obtain benefits of long-term care insurance 
if they have a specific medical condition. This study does not consider this benefit because the proportion of 
people receiving such care is very small. 
8 The input–output table is set at 2005. Therefore, we can set the parameter for theoretical analysis as 2005. 
However, we derive the result as recently as possible and use 2015 data to set the parameters. 
 
 
